It is found that electorally-induced
In the years since the Great Recession, US corporate profits have soared but business fixed investment remains depressed. This divergence has important implications for both cyclic recovery and long-run growth. One influential explanation focuses on the role of increased uncertainty (Bloom, Baker, and Davis 2016) . Greater uncertainty about energy prices, exchange rates, interest rates, environmental regulation, financial regulation, minimum wages, or any number of other political and economic variables increases uncertainty over the profitability of long-term investment projects raising the hurdle rate and reducing the number undertaken as firms "wait and see", delaying investment until the resolution of uncertainty (see Stokey 2015 for a recent example, Dixit 1992 for a detailed review). Nonetheless, there are no perfect measures of generalized uncertainty and research has not yet come to consensus on the strength of the connection between uncertainty and investment at either firm or aggregate levels.
Using an annual panel of data from US states spanning 1 , we relate state-specific manufacturing investment to the policy-uncertainty stemming from close elections for governor. Because state governors exercise considerable influence over legislation and considerable discretion over regulation and permitting, and because the state-level policies relevant to business investment vary systematically by party (Potrafke 2017), uncertainty over the partisan affiliation of the future governor is a source of political risk to firms considering investment. But voters' response to the state of the economy constitutes a clear threat of endogeneity to any estimate of the effects of political uncertainty on investment. Usefully, by removing the electoral advantages of incumbency, the lack of an incumbent in a race due to term limits raises uncertainty over the 1 The end date of the panel is limited by the availability of the longest single panel of state-level party polarization scores. We have verified our results using a more recent polarization measure available for 1990-2012. outcome of the election and thence subsequent policy, providing an instrument that allows us to estimate causal effects.
We have collected data on the actions of the incumbent governor during all gubernatorial elections during our sample period (see table 1 ). Naturally, many incumbents do not run for reelection. We focus on those reasons that seem plausibly exogenous: death or incapacity while in office or ineligibility to run due to term-limits. The latter makes up the vast majority of our cases. As of this writing, governors of 36 states are subject to term limits. As a result of variety in term lengths, term limits, the election year cycle, and the electoral fortune of incumbents, the incidence of term-limited incumbents is extremely diffuse. In other words, term-limited governors do not appear in a fixed collection of states with a regular periodicity. We discuss the instrument in detail in section III.D and
show that the incumbent's predicted vote share is always above 50%, no matter how bad the economy, thus ensuring that the loss of the incumbent makes the election more competitive.
<Table 1 about here>
Our measure of policy uncertainty is the product of two pieces. The first piece is a state-and-year-specific measure of the distance between the local Republican and Democratic parties (see Berry et al 1998 for a description). These are a general measure of the policy stakes of the election. The second piece is a gauge of electoral uncertainty which we measure as a log transformation of the ex-post electoral margin. The product is thus a measure of the difficulty in predicting the post-election economic policy stance of the governor's office. We then instrument using exogenous open races as described.
In our baseline specification, we find that in a state with average partisan polarization, in the calendar year of a gubernatorial election, the elasticity of manufacturing investment to our measure of policy uncertainty is -0.027. Both the significance and magnitude of this result are robust to various controls, measures, and estimators. We then split the sample and find that the result is heavily concentrated in states with professionalized legislatures. 3 This fits with previous findings that members of professionalized legislatures enable rather than inhibit implementation of a governor's legislative agenda (Woods and Baranowski 2006; Dilger, Krauss, and Moffett 1995; Ferguson 2003) .
Surprisingly, we find that manufacturing investment does not rebound following the resolution of uncertainty. This is at odds with current models of wait-and-see investment (e.g. Bizer and Judd 1989 or Stokey 2015) because such models deal with closed rather than open economies and thus do not admit the possibility that the investment is flexible in location as well as time. We show that election-year investment in neighboring states rises when own-state uncertainty rises. Likewise, own-state investment rises when average neighboring state uncertainty rises. Thus we have an instance where investment under uncertainty is not so much "waitand-see" as "flight-to-certainty".
We are not the first to contend with the difficulty of reliably measuring aggregate uncertainty by focusing on electoral uncertainty. Canes-Wrone and Park (2012) look at ten OECD countries and find that uncertainty over electoral outcomes is associated with a decline in private fixed investment. Julio and Yook (2013) find that irreversible FDI flows tend to fall prior to elections, especially in countries with a history of policy reversals. In the US, Canes-Wrone and Park (2013) find a decline in the quantity of home sales in advance of closely-contested gubernatorial elections. By focusing on the differences between party platforms and the uncertainty over electoral outcomes, we focus on a source of uncertainty that is (i) closely linked to policy, (ii) likely to impact a broad set of firms, and (iii) whose longitudinal variation can be reliably instrumented to deliver exogenous variation.
The next section explains the economic relevance of governors. Section II lays out our methods including the construction of electoral and policy uncertainty, the econometric specification, and choice of estimator. Section III presents both the baseline results and a look at the effects of legislative professionalism. Section IV concludes with a note on the broader applicability of the results.
I. The Economic Relevance of Governors
By focusing on US states rather than countries, we limit the extent of unobserved institutional heterogeneity, improve the comparability of the data, enable a larger sample than would be available in a cross-country setting, and facilitate the search for a valid instrument. The identity and partisan affiliation of the Governor are relevant to these policies.
Governors not only play a role in shaping legislation, they also exercise discretion in the implementation of regulations and negotiate special packages to attract prominent firms. Governors have direct control over the identity and tenure of regulators whose behavior determines the pace of permitting and thence investment. Governors play a key role in wooing marquee investments from large firms which may in turn have spillover effects. As a result, changes in the identity of the Governor can result in abrupt changes in policy. Moreover, firms and industry groups contribute a great deal of money to gubernatorial candidates, and these contributions tend to be consistently directed toward one party or the other.
See Falk and Shelton (2017) for a fuller discussion of these issues.
It is a commonly held view that legislatures and governors are opposing centers of power and thus gubernatorial power must be less relevant in states with strong, professional legislatures. However, Woods and Baranowski (2006) note that professional legislators have more resources at their disposal but are also more career-oriented in their choice of activities. Because oversight receives relatively little credit compared to legislative activity, professionalized legislatures tend to spend more time introducing and passing laws (Woods and Baranowski (2006) ) and less time overseeing gubernatorial administration of laws, a conclusion that draws support from legislators themselves (Elling 1992 , Baranowski 2001 . As a result, the executive branch is, counter-intuitively, relatively less constrained as the legislature professionalizes.
II. Methods
Our 
<Figure 1 about here>
Because small shocks are more likely than large shocks, the effect of an increase in vote margin on electoral uncertainty should be declining in the vote margin. In other words, the effect on uncertainty is larger when moving from a 5% margin to a 10% margin than it is between 25% and 30%. Because of this and to make our coefficients easily interpretable as elasticities, we construct our dependent variable based on the natural log of the vote margin. For state s in year t, let vote margin be VM st . Our first component of the dependent variable is electoral uncertainty, EU st.
(
The second term is negative to ensure that a smaller vote margin produces greater uncertainty. The first term is present to normalize so that an unopposed election (VM st = 100) produces EU st = 0. The resulting measure of electoral uncertainty varies from 0 in an unopposed election to ln(101) = 4.62 in a dead heat.
B. Polarization
Because there is a great deal of variation between states in the philosophy of government espoused by the average voter, both major parties adjust their platforms and legislative behaviors to accommodate local preferences. As a result, the policy-relevant difference between the two major parties varies a great deal from state to state. In states where there is very little difference between the parties, a given degree of electoral uncertainty might translate into very little policy uncertainty. To control for this, we scale the measure of electoral uncertainty (EU st ) by a state-and-year-specific measure of the distance between the two parties to achieve a measure of policy uncertainty (PU st ). We then normalize this number by dividing by the sample-average value. Thus coefficient γ in equation (3) 
C. Specification
Equation (3) describes our main specifications, where the panel indices s and t reference the US state and calendar year, respectively. Our vector of economic controls, X, includes the logged-level of real state GDP, the logged state unemployment rate, the logged value added in the state manufacturing sector, and the growth rate of real state GDP-less-manufacturing investment. 4 In addition, we include two lags of each of these variables plus two lags of the dependent variable. In some specifications, we include a time trend or year fixed effects which may capture changes in interest rates, inflation, the federal tax treatment of investment, presidential election uncertainty, and other factors relevant to the investment decision.
We include the first lag of the dependent variable to acknowledge that there is an underlying level of investment that is unrelated to political factors-due to the size of the industry, the age of the relevant plants, the rates of depreciation and technological change in the state-wide mix of industries, etc. Moreover, being that the timing of investment spending is somewhat flexible, recent past investment either above or below this trend speaks to the volume of pent up demand, hence the need for a specification with two lags. The coefficients on the first and second lags bear out this interpretation. The first lag is positive and highly significant, indicative of these omitted variables. The second lag is also positive and significant, though an order of magnitude smaller than the first. For a given level of investment in t-1, a state with low investment in t-2 is likely a state that has just had an uptick in t-1 satisfying some of the time-elastic demand whereas a state with high investment in t-2 is in the opposite position of having built up some elastic demand. By this logic, a third lag should be irrelevant as the first lag controls for the omitted variables, the second lag for the pent up demand. And indeed a third lag is an order of magnitude smaller than the second and statistically indistinguishable from zero. Schwartz' Bayesian Information
Criterion confirms the choice of two lags.
The variable of interest is our measure of uncertainty surrounding the partisan affiliation of the victor, which was described in the previous sections. Our data are annual, and we relate the investment in a calendar year with the closeness of an election in that same calendar year. In years without elections, both electoral and policy uncertainty are zero. The vast majority of our elections take place in early November, suggesting that the concurrent calendar year is predominantly the proximate pre-election period and thus the proper window in which to observe effects on investment.
D. Estimators
We estimate equation (3) using both 2SLS panel fixed effects and two-step system GMM with collapsed instruments so that there is just one instrument for each variable and lag length, rather than one for each time period, variable, and lag length. In each case we use the strictly exogenous instrument for political uncertainty described in the previous subsection.
After collapsing, we are left with j= 50 instruments and N= 50 panels (states).
Hansen's test of over-identifying restrictions cannot reject the null of valid instruments. In later specifications, we split the sample in two according to whether a state's legislature is relatively more or less professional. This results in j = 50, N = 25. At this point, the p-value for Hansen's test soars and it seems likely that Hansen's test has lost power (Roodman 2009b) which may concurrently suggest bias from over-fitting. Unfortunately, this means we are unable to use system GMM on that part of the sample in which the effect is concentrated (the states with professionalized legislatures). As a result, we rely on FE IV for the bulk of the paper. Basic results from system GMM are shown to confirm that system GMM delivers similar results.
Lastly, we have to account for spatial correlation among the error terms. Since we show that uncertainty in one state leads to a rise in uncertainty in neighboring states, the errors of these neighboring states are contemporaneously correlated.
We adapt code from Solomon Hsiang (2010) to allow errors to be correlated across states that share a neighbor. Table 2 shows the results of our baseline regression of manufacturing investment on the extent of election-induced policy uncertainty that year plus economic controls. Because both independent and dependent variables are in logs, the coefficient of interest (top row) is interpretable as an elasticity. The first column is the OLS result which is small and statistically indistinguishable from zero. The second column shows the baseline IV. Displaying the expected sign, doubling our measure of policy uncertainty leads to a 2.7% decline in investment. Adding a time trend (column 3) allays fears that the result is driven by a secular trend in US manufacturing. As described above, political uncertainty is the product of electoral uncertainty and polarization. Our instrument is unrelated to polarization, but is relevant for electoral uncertainty. The effect on investment of electoral uncertainty alone (column 4) is quite similar to that of political uncertainty. This may be an indication that the generic left-right spectrum is not perfectly aligned with the policy cleavages relevant to businesses. Using state unemployment rather than state GDP (column 6) limits the sample but reconfirms the result.
III. Results

A. Baseline Specification
<Table 2 about here> B. Legislative Professionalism
We have argued that the stakes are likely to be greater where the legislature is professionalized and thus both governor and legislature are more capable of intervention. Table 3 shows the effects of splitting the sample at the median value of legislative professionalism. It is clear that it is in states with high legislative professionalism that we see the greater effect of uncertainty in gubernatorial elections. Indeed, when unemployment and a time trend are included, the estimated elasticity in the more professional half of the sample is in excess of -0.05 (column 5).
<Table 3 about here>
As we argued in section 3.4, we believe that in a panel of these dimensions, the FE estimator is more reliable than GMM. Nonetheless, we have reported GMM estimates of the baseline specification and the split by legislative professionalism in 
C. A Flight to Stability
The wait-and-see theory of investment under uncertainty suggests that we should see a rebound of investment once the election has concluded and the uncertainty is resolved. Figure 2 shows the effect of uncertainty in year t on investment in years t-2 to t+2. Manufacturing investment in the two years before the election year is unrelated to electoral uncertainty, which reassures us of the specification.
Puzzlingly, however, we see no post-electoral rebound of investment.
<Figure 2 about here>
One potential explanation is that the investment does not return because it has already been completed elsewhere. One example for which we have found direct evidence (albeit not within the manufacturing sector) is the film industry. We then regress it on our uncertainty measure and bootstrap to achieve the proper standard errors. In this way, we are estimating whether electoral uncertainty in one state leads to an unusual rise in concurrent investment in neighboring states, after controlling for the economic and political situation in these states. We find that it does. As shown in figure 2 , the election-year decline in own-state investment is mirrored by an increase in neighboring state investment. We then return to the original specification and add the average policy uncertainty in neighboring states. Neighboring uncertainty is positive and significant (Table 2 , column 5). Thus we measure statistically significant flows in both directions: to a state from neighbors undergoing an election and from a state undergoing an election to its neighbors.
D. Checking the Instrument
Incumbents enjoy a large electoral advantage (name recognition, free press, etc.)
and are reelected at a high rate (Carey, Niemi, Powell 2000 among many others), thus an election in which there is no incumbent running is generally an election whose outcome is less certain. However, it is possible that an incumbent's party is saddled with a bad economy or a tarnished party brand. If the incumbent party is actually an underdog, then removal of this incumbent and his/her incumbency advantages might, by further handicapping the underdog, make the election outcome more easily forecast. To rule out such a scenario, we regress the neighbor to calculate the weighted sum "neighbor's residuals". Repeating the exercise from figure 2 delivers the familiar statistically significant rise in investment in competing states when a state undergoes electoral uncertainty. 
IV. Discussion
We have estimated the effect of electorally induced policy uncertainty on investment in the manufacturing sector. We have chosen US states because they afford a large sample with high quality comparable data and relatively homogeneous political institutions. More importantly, term limits provide a convincing instrument allowing us to estimate causal effects. Because state governors exercise considerable power over legislation and considerable discretion over regulation and permitting, and because the policies relevant to business investment vary systematically by party, uncertainty over the partisan affiliation of the future governor is a source of political risk to firms considering investing in-state. Thus we have used electoral uncertainty, scaled by the policy distance between parties, as a measure of policy uncertainty. As expected, we find that in the calendar year of a gubernatorial election, state investment in the manufacturing sector declines when the election is less certain. The elasticity is -0.027, implying that doubling the electorally-induced policy uncertainty will result in a 2.7% fall in investment. This is in line with the sole comparable prior study. Canes-Wrone and Park (2012) There is unlikely to be one precise channel whereby policy uncertainty affects investment. Prior work has found evidence of partisan differences at the statelevel on both aggregate demand (Potrafke 2017) and regulatory enforcement (Scholz and Wei 1986, Helland 1998) . There is also abundant evidence of partisan effects on firms and industries (e.g. Knight 2006). The specific investmentrelevant policies over which partisan politics casts uncertainty no doubt vary by time, place, industry, and firm. 9 Rather, the goal of this paper is to propose an effective instrument to enable causal inference and to bring evidence of the hitherto unremarked possibility that policy uncertainty within one polity does not simply delay investment, but may cause it to flee to competing polities. 7 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for raising this point. 
Governor Turnover
We assembled a comprehensive dataset indicating, for each gubernatorial election, whether the incumbent was running and, if not, why not. From this data we derive our instrument of exogenous variation in the degree to which an electoral result is uncertain ex-ante. Our coding distinguishes between the following alternatives: death/incapacity, term-limited, appointed to a higher office (e.g. US Ambassador), resigned to run for higher office (e.g. US Senate) whether successful or not, resigned for other political or personal reasons, recalled, impeached/convicted, or incumbent simply chose not to seek reelection. To ensure exogeneity, we focus on the first three.
Studies of the economic vote suggest that voters typically respond to performance only within the last year (Nannestad and Paldam 1994) so if the Governor had been in office at least twelve months prior to the election, he was considered the incumbent. If not, his predecessor was considered the incumbent and the predecessor's reasons for leaving office early would be relevant.
Polarization
To measure the policy distance between the local Democrats and Republicans in a particular state, we use data from Berry et al. (1998 Berry et al. ( , 2010 but during the bulk of our sample, scores are fairly stable over time, though they exhibit considerable variation in the cross-section. For more information, see Squire (2007) .
Real State Manufacturing Investment
Our dependent variable is the log of real capital expenditure in manufacturing industries in a given state in a given year. We use data assembled by Chirinko and
Wilson (2009) 
Real State Manufacturing Output
We control for the size of the state's manufacturing sector using a measure of value added in the manufacturing sector. The raw data, assembled by Chirinko and Wilson, derive from the ASM and are deflated using producer prices.
Real State GDP
We use state-level gross domestic product (GDP) data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). We deflate using a state-specific cost of living index constructed by Berry, Fording, and Hanson (2000) . Where DIME available Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Unemployment
